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AN EASY CASE MAKES BAD LAW: THE MISAPPLICATION OF
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY IN MAXWELL’S PIC-PAC, INC. V.
DEHNER, 887 F. SUPP. 2D 733 (W.D. KY. 2012)
Colin P. Pool∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Expressing displeasure or incredulity with “dumb laws” is a common
pastime; there are, in fact, entire books devoted to the subject.1
Restrictions on the sale of alcohol are particular targets for derision,
either because of their apparent basis in a moral disapproval of alcohol
or because of the inconvenience they create for consumers.2 Just such a
“dumb” restriction was at the center of a recent Western District of
Kentucky decision. In striking down this restriction, the court followed
other lower federal courts in determining that some laws are so bad that
they run afoul of the U.S. Constitution. However, these purportedly
innocuous decisions could have far-reaching implications.
On January 10, 2011, The Food With Wine Coalition (FWWC), a
Kentucky nonprofit corporation, along with Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc., a
Kentucky corporation that owns and operates a grocery store in
Louisville, Kentucky, filed a complaint against the state of Kentucky
alleging that a provision of the state’s liquor control regulations violated
the Equal Protection provisions of the United States and Kentucky
Constitutions.3 Specifically, the complaint alleged that Kentucky
Revised Statute § 243.230(5), which prohibits grocery stores and gas
stations from selling wine and liquor but potentially allows all other
retailers to do so, creates a classification that lacks a rational relationship
to a legitimate state interest.4 Prior to filing suit, FWWC had lobbied
the state legislature to allow grocery stores to sell wine.5 The failure of
these efforts led the plaintiffs to seek relief from the courts.6
∗ Associate Member, 2012–2013 University of Cincinnati Law Review. The author would like
to thank Clark Neily and Professor Chris Bryant for their assistance.
1. See, e.g., JEFF KOON, ANDY POWELL & WARD SCHUMAKER, YOU MAY NOT TIE AN
ALLIGATOR TO A FIRE HYDRANT: 101 REAL DUMB LAWS (2002).
2. See, e.g., Editorial, Repeal of Sunday Restriction on Alcohol Sales Is Overdue, DANBURY
NEWS-TIMES, May 2, 2012, http://www.newstimes.com/default/article/Repeal-of-Sunday-restriction-onalcohol-sales-is-3528534.php.
3. Complaint at ¶¶5, 6, 19, Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733 (W.D. Ky.
2012) (No. 3:11-CV-18-H).
4. Id. at ¶19.
5. Intervening Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary
Judgment at 2, Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733 (W.D. Ky. 2012) (No. 3:11CV18-H).
6. Id. at 5.
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Within a month, Liquor Outlet, L.L.C. d/b/a The Party Source, which
operates a liquor store in Bellevue, Kentucky, had moved to intervene as
a defendant in the dispute.7 The Party Source believed that the state
could not adequately represent its interest in the continuance of the
Kentucky alcohol regulation scheme because the state had no economic
interest to protect in the litigation.8 After the motion to intervene was
sustained, all parties moved for summary judgment, agreeing that no
material facts were contested and that the dispute could be settled as a
matter of law.9
On August 14, 2012, the Western District of Kentucky found in favor
of the plaintiffs and struck down the statute.10 While acknowledging
that the type of judicial review required in cases challenging economic
regulations accords tremendous deference to the legislature, it also
asserted that such deference is not an abdication of judicial review.11 In
deciding the case in this manner, the court joined a growing trend
among lower federal courts by applying a more exacting standard of
judicial review to economic legislation than is typical in modern
constitutional jurisprudence.12 As such, the case raises age-old
questions regarding the proper role of the judiciary in the protection of
economic liberty.13 The decision is particularly interesting because of
its impending appeal to the Sixth Circuit, which has recently shown a
willingness to strike down economic legislation on Equal Protection
grounds.14 Were the Sixth Circuit to affirm the decision of the trial
court, it would exacerbate a circuit split on the question of economic
Equal Protection, thus calling the future of Equal Protection
jurisprudence into doubt.15
Part II of this Note will examine the Kentucky statute in question and
the relevant constitutional issues. Part III will discuss the district court’s
decision in depth.
Finally, Parts IV and V will discuss the
jurisprudential questions the case raises and conclude that, while the
7. Motion to Intervene, Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733 (W.D. Ky.
2012) (No. 3:11-CV-18-H).
8. Id. at ¶¶13, 22.
9. Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733, 739 (W.D. Ky. 2012).
10. Id. at 752.
11. Id. at 751.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See, e.g., PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL (1998);
DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST
PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011).
14. See Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
15. See, e.g., Brianne J. Gorod, Note, Does Lochner Live? The Disturbing Implications of
Craigmiles v. Giles, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 537 (2003); Lana Harfoush, Comment, Grave
Consequences for Economic Liberty: The Funeral Industry’s Protectionist Occupational Licensing
Scheme, the Circuit Split, and Why It Matters, 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 135 (2011).
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trial court decided the case against the weight of Supreme Court
precedent, there is a possible avenue under the Kentucky Constitution to
properly strike the law.
II. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND TO MAXWELL’S
A. The Kentucky Statute and its Accompanying Regulation
The first iteration of Kentucky Revised Statute § 243.230, which
controls eligibility for retail package licenses,16 was enacted in 1938.17
That statute, like the current one, specifically prohibited “grocery store[s
and] filling station[s]” from obtaining package licenses.18 The reason
for creating this classification is unknown. The distinction between
grocery stores and other retailers is perhaps a remnant of the practice
during Prohibition where drugstores were still allowed to sell alcohol by
prescription for “medicinal purposes.”19 The statute’s current language
reads as follows:
No retail package or drink license for the sale of distilled spirits or wine
shall be issued for any premises used as or in connection with the
operation of any business in which a substantial part of the commercial
transaction consists of selling at retail staple groceries or gasoline and
20
lubricating oil.

Kentucky regulations enacted in 1985 further clarify the terms
“substantial part of the commercial transaction” (“ten percent or greater
of the gross sales receipts as determined on a monthly basis”)21 and
“staple groceries” (“any food or food product intended for human
consumption except alcoholic beverages, tobacco, soft drinks, candy,
hot foods, and food products prepared for immediate
consumption”).22
An effect of the statute and its accompanying regulation is that
drugstores and convenience stores that do not sell gasoline are permitted
to apply for a retail package license while grocery stores and gas stations

16. Kentucky licenses wine and liquor sales through a single retail package license. Maxwell’s
Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733, 742 (W.D. Ky. 2012). Thus, the denial of a retail package
license prevents a retailer from selling both wine and liquor. The types of retailers who can sell malt
beverages are not restricted in the same manner. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.280 (West 1998).
17. Maxwell’s, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 740.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 741.
20. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.230(5).
21. 804 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 4:270 § 1 (1985).
22. Id. § 2.
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are not.23 The crux of the plaintiffs’ complaint was that this
classification system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.24
B. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides in part: “No State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”25 This language
“is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike;”26 the government may not classify persons based on
impermissible or arbitrary criteria.27 Since 1937, Supreme Court
jurisprudence in this area has established a three-tiered system of
judicial review.28 The highest tier, known as “strict scrutiny,” is used
when a legislative classification distinguishes between persons on a
suspect basis or infringes a person’s ability to exercise a fundamental
right.29
The middle tier, “intermediate scrutiny,” is used for
classifications which distinguish between persons on a “quasi-suspect”
basis.30 The lowest tier, “rational basis review,” is used for general
economic and social welfare legislation which does not involve
fundamental rights or suspect classes.31
During the so-called Lochner era (ca. 1900–1937),32 the Supreme
Court would often choose not to defer to the opinion of the other
branches of government when ruling on economic regulations due to a

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Maxwell’s, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 738–39.
Id. at 743.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.2(a) (5th ed. 2012), available at Westlaw 3 TREATISE ON CONST. L.
§ 18.2(a).
28. Id. § 18.3(a)(i).
29. Id. § 18.3(a)(iii). Suspect classes are those based on race and/or national origin. Id.
“Fundamental rights” include freedom of association, the right to vote and participate in the electoral
process, interstate travel, a right to fairness in procedure, and a right to privacy. Id. § 15.7.
30. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435. “Quasi-suspect”
classes are those based on gender or legitimacy of birth. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 27,
§ 18.3(a)(iv).
31. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 27, § 18.3(a)(ii).
32. This period takes its name from the seminal case Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905),
where the Supreme Court held that liberty of contract was a fundamental right under a theory of
substantive due process. The decision instituted an era of economic substantive due process, where
exacting standards of judicial review were applied to economic legislation, that has proved to be one of
the most criticized and controversial eras in Supreme Court jurisprudence. For detailed discussion of
Lochner and its legacy see KENS, supra note 13.
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belief that economic rights were “fundamental.”33 Since 1937,34 with
the Court’s decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the standard for
rational basis review has been extremely deferential to the legislature: a
classification’s validity is presumed, and it must only be rationally
related to a legitimate state interest to be upheld.35 Such regulations
may be based on “rational speculation unsupported by evidence and
empirical data” and will fail only if there is no “reasonably conceivable
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”36
In addition, the challenging party must negate every conceivable basis
which might support the statute.37
The classic example of the Court’s application of this standard to
economic legislation is in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,38
where an Oklahoma statute prevented opticians from fitting eyeglass
lenses without a prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist.39
The district court held that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause
since it subjected opticians to the regulatory system but exempted sellers
of ready-to-wear glasses.40 The Supreme Court, however, overturned
this decision, holding that, while the statute “may exact a needless,
wasteful requirement,” it “need not be in every respect logically
consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an
evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”41 The
Court also held that in correcting such evils, the legislature may enact
different remedies for different problems, and may take “one step at a
time.”42 In short, “[t]he prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes
no further than the invidious discrimination”43 and “for protection
against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to

33. See Gorod, supra note 15, at 539.
34. The end of the Lochner era coincided with the Court’s opposition to President Franklin
Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation. Roosevelt responded with his “Court Packing Plan.” See WILLIAM
E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL: 1932–1940, at 231–38 (1963). The
conventional wisdom holds that the Court’s ideological shift away from stringent judicial review
following Roosevelt’s proposal was a response calculated to preserve the Court’s integrity as a neutral
arbiter of constitutional issues, though this reading of history is disputed. See, e.g., id.; BARRY
CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
(1998).
35. Pennel v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988).
36. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 315 (1993).
37. Id. at 315.
38. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
39. Id. at 486.
40. Id. at 488.
41. Id. at 487–88.
42. Id. at 489.
43. Id.
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the courts.”44 The result is that classifications held to the rational basis
test will almost always be upheld, making this type of review a “virtual
rubber stamp.”45
However, the Court has not always deferred to the legislature when
engaging in rational basis review.46 In City of Cleburne, Texas v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., the Court, ostensibly using rational basis
review, invalidated the requirement that a home for the mentally
disabled could be constructed only with a special use permit.47 Justice
Marshall noted in his concurrence that the standard the Court used in its
decision was not the “traditional” rational basis test used in
Williamson.48 He explained that the Court’s close analysis of the
evidentiary record to determine the legislation’s factual foundation, and
its expression of disbelief in the necessity of the statute, constituted the
use of a more powerful scrutiny even if the majority expressly denied it
was doing so.49 Marshall warned that such action by the Court created
precedent which would encourage federal courts to “subject economic
and commercial classifications to similar and searching ‘ordinary’
rational-basis review,” without “provid[ing a] principled foundation for
determining when more searching inquiry is to be invoked.”50
This heightened form of rational basis review, sometimes called
“rational basis with bite,” was later used by the Court in Romer v. Evans
to strike down an amendment to the Colorado state constitution that
disadvantaged homosexual and bisexual individuals,51 and in Lawrence
v. Texas to invalidate state laws which criminalized consensual
sodomy.52 These rational basis with bite decisions are characterized by
a search for the actual purpose of the law, a careful evaluation of
whether that purpose is permissible, and a review of the record for
44. Id. at 488 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)).
45. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 79
(1997).
46. Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971
Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 357 (1999). According to Farrell, there were 110
rational basis cases from 1971 through 1996, ten of which were successful for the plaintiffs.
47. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985).
48. Id. at 458–59 (Marshall, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 457–60.
50. Id. at 460.
51. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
52. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The Court did not articulate what standard it
was using to invalidate the law in Lawrence. It is presumed that the Court was applying so-called
“rational basis with bite.” See Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the
Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on
Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2770 (2005). The Court also used a substantive due
process theory rather than an equal protection theory to decide the case. However, Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence used an equal protection theory, Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579, and, regardless, the rational
basis standard for substantive due process is identical to the standard used for equal protection.
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factual evidence of a bona fide correlation between classification and
purpose.53 While scholars, commentators, and other federal judges have
identified the use of this heightened form of rational basis review,54 it is
important to note that the Court has never acknowledged its existence in
a majority opinion.55
While the modern Court has not used rational basis with bite to
invalidate purely economic regulations,56 several lower courts, in
fulfillment of Justice Marshall’s prophecy, have begun to apply this
standard to such laws.57 Perhaps the most notable example came in
Craigmiles v. Giles,58 a 2002 Sixth Circuit case involving a Tennessee
statute that allowed only licensed funeral directors to sell caskets, urns,
and other funeral merchandise.59 As a result, retailers who sold such
merchandise, but did not engage in embalming, cremation, or other
funeral services, could not participate in the casket market,60 giving
licensed funeral directors a monopoly.61 This was a particularly
burdensome requirement because state law required two years of
training to become a licensed funeral director.62
While noting that only a handful of statutes have been invalidated
using rational basis review, the Sixth Circuit nevertheless invalidated the
Tennessee statute on this ground.63 It agreed with the district court’s
finding that the law did not promote public health or safety, and that the
only practical difference between the plaintiffs’ caskets and those sold
by licensed funeral directors was that the latter’s were “systematically

53. Farrell, supra note 46, at 359, 373.
54. See Smith, supra note 52, at 2770; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
55. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1223–24 (10th Cir. 2004).
56. Id. at 1224. However, the Court invalidated an economic regulation using what appeared to
be a heightened form of rational basis review in Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985), a
case involving an Alabama statute that taxed out-of-state insurance companies on gross premiums more
heavily than Alabama-based insurers. The Court found this statute to fail rational basis equal protection
analysis. This decision appears to be an outlier, since later in the same term, the Court unanimously
found similar legislation to pass rational basis review. See Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of
Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159 (1985). See also id. at 179–80 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Gail Lynn
Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779,
798–800 (1987). The Court has not applied rational basis with bite to any economic regulations since
1985. Perhaps it is significant that the Metro. Life decision predated the Cleburne decision by
approximately three months.
57. See Anthony B. Sanders, Comment, Exhumation Through Burial: How Challenging Casket
Regulations Helped Unearth Economic Substantive Due Process in Craigmiles v. Giles, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 668, 678 (2004).
58. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).
59. Id. at 222–23.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 229.
62. Id. at 222, 224.
63. Id. at 225.
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more expensive.”64 Finding that the law’s only purpose was to
“privilege certain businessmen over others at the expense of
consumers,” the court held the law lacked a legitimate purpose and
therefore failed rational basis review.65 The court took care to assert
that its holding was “not a return to Lochner,” but also that “rational
basis review, while deferential, is not toothless.”66 Nevertheless, several
commentators noted that the Sixth Circuit was clearly using a more
exacting standard of review in Craigmiles, thus implying a step back
towards the Lochner era.67
Through happenstance, a casket regulation would be the centerpiece
of the next major case involving Equal Protection and economic
legislation. In Powers v. Harris, involving an Oklahoma statute
practically identical to that in Craigmiles, the Tenth Circuit disagreed
with the Sixth Circuit’s ruling and found that intrastate economic
protectionism was a legitimate state interest.68 It also found that the
Sixth Circuit’s focus on the legislature’s actual motives in enacting the
statute was barred by traditional rational basis review and that its
reliance on Cleburne as a model was unwarranted.69 The court felt that
even if Cleburne and Romer signaled the creation of a more exacting
form of rational basis review, Supreme Court jurisprudence limited its
use to classifications that merit such scrutiny, which the court felt did
not include economic classifications.70
Alternatively, the court
reasoned, the so-called rational basis with bite of Cleburne and Romer
may just be normal rational basis applied to situations where the only
conceivable state interest was to harm a politically unpopular group.71
In either case, the court declined to examine the Oklahoma statute under
anything other than traditional rational basis review and upheld the law,
finding that “intrastate economic protectionism, absent a violation of a
specific federal statutory or constitutional provision, is a legitimate state
interest and that the [Oklahoma statute was] rationally related to this
legitimate end.”72

64. Id. at 225–26.
65. Id. at 229.
66. Id.
67. E.g., Gorod, supra note 15, at 541; Sanders, supra note 57, at 693.
68. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1218–19 (10th Cir. 2004). Interstate economic
protectionism is usually invalidated under the Dormant Commerce Clause, see Granholm v. Heald, 544
U.S. 460 (2005), or when employment is involved, under the Article IV, § 2 Privileges and Immunities
Clause, see United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Camden Cnty. & Vicinity v. Mayor & Council of
Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
69. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1223.
70. Id. at 1224.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1225.
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The Supreme Court denied certiorari to Powers, declining to resolve a
circuit split on the question of whether intrastate economic
protectionism is a legitimate state interest.73 Since then, other federal
courts have addressed challenges to economic regulation on Equal
Protection grounds. For example, in Merrifield v. Lockyer, the Ninth
Circuit struck down a California pest control licensing regime that
exempted those who controlled bats, raccoons, skunks, and squirrels
without the use of pesticides, but specifically did not exempt those who
controlled rats, mice, and pigeons without the use of pesticides.74 The
court found that, like in Craigmiles, the singling out of three types of
pests from other vertebrates was an unacceptable form of economic
protectionism.75 The court also followed Craigmiles in asserting that its
decision was not a return to Lochner, directly quoting the relevant
language from the Craigmiles opinion.76
Another recent case, St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, followed
Craigmiles in striking down a Louisiana law that permitted only statelicensed funeral directors to sell caskets.77 The Fifth Circuit found there
was no rational relationship between the state’s interests in consumer
protection and public health and safety, and the limitation of casket sales
to funeral directors.78 It also found that the economic protectionism
resulting from the statute was not a legitimate state interest because it
was not “economic protectionism in service of the public good
but . . . ‘economic’ protection of the rulemakers’ pockets.”79 It also
explicitly denied that the decision was a return to Lochner.80 Also, in
Clayton v. Steinagel, the District of Utah found that Utah’s cosmetology
licensing scheme failed rational basis review as applied to an African
hair braider because the “facts demonstrate an insufficient rational
relationship between public health and safety and the actual regulatory
scheme.”81
C. The Equal Protection Provisions in the Kentucky State Constitution
While the Maxwell’s plaintiffs’ primary argument centered on the
U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, they also argued that the

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 920 (2005).
Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 981–82, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 991.
Id. at 992.
St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 223–26.
Id. at 226–27.
Id. at 227.
Clayton v. Steinagel, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1215 (D. Utah 2012).
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legislation was barred by the equal protection provisions in the
Kentucky Constitution.82 The relevant language reads as follows:
All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and
inalienable rights . . . . Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives,
liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in
the largest majority. All men, when they form a social compact, are
equal; and no grant of exclusive, separate public emoluments or
privileges shall be made to any man or set of men, except in consideration
83
of public services . . . .

Additionally, Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution include
prohibitions on “special legislation.”84
In this context, special
legislation is “that which favors a special interest to the detriment of the
rest of society.”85
The Kentucky Supreme Court has found that the combination of these
provisions gives additional protection for individual rights against
legislative interference, prompting the court “at times to apply a
guarantee of individual rights in equal protection cases that is higher
than the minimum guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.”86 This
higher standard requires a “reasonable basis” or a “substantial and
justifiable reason” for discriminatory economic regulations.87 The party
claiming the validity of a challenged classification has the burden of
proving a valid nexus between that “classification and the purpose for
which the statute in question was drafted. There must be substantially
more than merely a theoretical basis for a distinction. Rather, there must
be a firm basis in reality.”88 While it is unclear whether the “substantial
and justifiable reason” standard applies in all cases,89 the Kentucky
Supreme Court has stated that its standard for evaluating economic
legislation, “while deferential, is certainly not demure,”90 and that a law
that fails traditional rational basis review (as in Williamson) will also

82. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Maxwell’s PicPac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733 (W.D. Ky. 2012) (No. 3:11-CV-18-H).
83. KY. CONST., §§ 1–3.
84. Id. §§ 59–60. Section 59 states: “The General Assembly shall not pass local or special acts
concerning any of the following subjects, or for any of the following purposes, namely: . . . In all other
cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.” Section 60 states:
“The General Assembly shall not indirectly enact any special . . . act by the repeal in part of a general
act.”
85. Yeoman v. Ky. Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459, 468 (Ky. 1998).
86. Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Cheyenne Res., Inc., 163 S.W.3d 408, 418 (Ky. 2005).
87. Id. at 418–19.
88. Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 468.
89. “Cases applying the heightened standard are limited to the particular facts of those cases.”
Elk Horn Coal Corp., 163 S.W.3d at 419.
90. Vision Mining, Inc. v. Gardner, 364 S.W.3d 455, 469 (Ky. 2011).
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fail the heightened standard.91 Examples of the Kentucky Supreme
Court applying this heightened standard include striking down a
worker’s compensation statute that required different standards of proof
to show different types of pneumoconiosis,92 and striking down a statute
that provided a special immunity from suit to architects, engineers, and
builders.93
D. Does Section Two of the Twenty-First Amendment Affect the
Analytical Framework?
While the question presented in Maxwell’s is principally a matter of
economic Equal Protection, the analysis is possibly complicated by the
fact that the Kentucky statute in question regulates the sale of alcohol.94
As such, it must also be analyzed under Section Two of the TwentyFirst Amendment, which reads: “The transportation or importation into
any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or
use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is
hereby prohibited.”95 This language gives wide latitude to the states in
how they choose to regulate the sale of liquor,96 and because they are
economic regulations, they will be held to the rational basis test unless
they involve a suspect or quasi-suspect class or a fundamental right.97
Thus, the power to regulate liquor sales is almost limitless.98 However,
as the Supreme Court noted in Craig v. Boren, the Twenty-First
Amendment lacks sufficient strength “to defeat an otherwise established
claim of invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.”99 Thus, while there may be a greater presumption in favor of
validity for state liquor control measures because of the Twenty-First
Amendment, arbitrary legislation in this area is still presumably
vulnerable to attack under rational basis review.100

91. Elk Horn Coal Corp., 163 S.W.3d at 419.
92. Vision Mining, Inc., 364 S.W.3d at 473–74.
93. Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1985).
94. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.230(5) (West 1998).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
96. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 116 (1972).
97. Shelley Ross Saxer, License to Sell: Constitutional Protection Against State or Local
Government Regulation of Liquor Licensing, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441, 484 (1995).
98. Id. at 489.
99. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 207 (1976).
100. Parks v. Allen, 426 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1970).
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III. THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY’S DECISION IN MAXWELL’S
PIC-PAC, INC. V. DEHNER
After dismissing several preliminary challenges to the plaintiffs’
claim,101 the court outlined rational basis as the appropriate standard of
review, noting that “modern application of rational review upholds the
long-established principal of judicial restraint and deference to
legislative determinations . . . but also guards against government
action that is arbitrary or lacks any legitimate purpose.”102 It
surveyed numerous federal and state court decisions addressing liquor
control schemes, finding that none were precisely on point, but that
collectively they stood for the proposition that “when an alcohol control
statute makes a classification based on how businesses sell alcohol, the
statute will generally satisfy rational review. But classifications among
potential alcohol vendors seemingly without a rational link to a
conceivable legislative purpose are subject to meaningful judicial
review.”103 It then began its rational basis analysis.
The court reiterated that the standard of review did not require the
state to articulate a particular purpose or rationale for the statute, nor did
it need to speculate on the legislature’s motives.104 Nevertheless, the
state suggested six supposedly legitimate state interests to justify the
statute:
(1) stricter regulation of more potent alcoholic beverages; (2) curbing
potential abuse by limiting access to the products; (3) keeping pricing
among merchants competitive, but not so low as to promote excessive
consumption; (4) limiting the potential for underage access; (5) limiting
alcohol sales to premises where personal observation of the purchase
occurs; and (6) balancing the availability of a controversial product
105
between those who want to purchase it and those who seek to ban it.

The court could not imagine any other possible interests, and in a
footnote, pointed out that due to the binding precedent of Craigmiles,
protecting businesses that currently possess a liquor license from
competition could not be considered a legitimate state interest.106
The court then proceeded to address each of these proffered interests
in turn. It rejected the idea that the statute served to limit the availability

101. The Intervening Defendant challenged the plaintiffs’ standing and also argued that their
claim was barred by a statute of limitations. Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733, pt.
II (W.D. Ky. 2012). Neither issue is of relevance to this Note, however, and will not be discussed.
102. Maxwell’s, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 744–45.
103. Id. at 746.
104. Id. at 746–47.
105. Id. at 747.
106. Id. at 747 n.10.
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of more potent alcoholic beverages because the state failed to
demonstrate why it distinguished between a “grocery-selling drugstore
like Walgreens . . . [and] a pharmaceutical-selling grocery store like
Kroger,” and how that distinction rationally related to limiting higher
proof alcohol sales.107 The court then acknowledged that keeping
pricing among merchants competitive, but not too low, was a legitimate
interest, but also found this justification to be lacking because there was
no rational relationship between “the degree to which a business sells
non-grocery items more than it sells grocery items” and its impact on
liquor and wine prices.108
The court then tackled the argument that the statute limited access to
the products, and therefore curbed abuse and underage use.109 It
acknowledged that Kentucky was free to limit the number of liquor
outlets so long as it did not do so in an arbitrary manner.110 It found,
however, that there was no rational relationship between the statute and
this goal because
the Statute does not limit package sales of spirits and wine to stores
whose primary business is the sale of those products. Instead, it allows
package liquor licenses to stores whose primary business is anything
other than groceries or gas . . . . Thus, the rational bases for limiting
package liquor licenses to traditional package liquor stores are irrelevant
111
here because the Statute does not make this classification.

It also rejected the idea that the use of “self-checkout” machines by
some grocery stores—which give these stores less direct observation of
sales—justified the statute because drugstores are free under the statute
to install such machines and continue selling liquor and wine.112
Finally, the court addressed the justification that grocery stores are
community gathering centers where people with diametrically opposed
viewpoints on the sale of intoxicating liquors intermingle.113 According
to the state, by allowing grocery stores to sell beer but not wine and
liquor, the legislature was striking a balance between these two
viewpoints and seeking to limit direct conflict between them.114 The
court found that while Kentucky was free to prohibit the sale of liquor in
community gathering centers, it could not arbitrarily limit the

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 748.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 749.
Id.
Id. at 750.
Id.
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prohibition to some centers but exclude others.115 Such legislative line
drawing must be necessary and have a rational basis.116 The court
concluded that this basis was lacking, and that the state simply “wanted
to limit liquor sales generally and to maintain somewhat the status quo,
and it did so by arbitrarily distinguishing grocers from all other
retailers.”117
It concluded its rational basis review by reiterating that there
appeared to be no stated reasons in the legislative history for drawing
this distinction between types of retailers, and that as time has passed,
the distinctions between grocery stores and drugstores have become
increasingly insignificant, since most drugstores sell groceries and many
grocery stores sell prescription drugs.118 And even though the Supreme
Court held in Williamson that legislatures “must be allowed leeway to
approach a perceived problem incrementally,” the court did not believe
that this was what the legislature was doing since “the 74-year-old
statute has become more arbitrary over time.”119 In short, the court
found that
Kentucky ‘may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an
asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or
irrational.’ Here, the attenuated or non-existent relationship between the
Statute’s classification and any number of potential legislative goals
leaves the Court with no other conclusion than that the Statute offends the
Equal Protection Clause and, for that reason, must be struck down as
120
unconstitutional.

The court briefly addressed the question of whether the statute also
violated the Kentucky Constitution. It found that since the statute failed
traditional rational basis review, it also failed the potentially higher
standard of review accorded by the Kentucky Constitution, and
discussed the issue no further.121 It offered no opinion on whether
Kentucky’s higher standard of review was warranted.122

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 751.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 751–52 (citations omitted).
Id. at Part V.
Id. at 752.
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IV. ANALYSIS: THE KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION IS PREFERABLE TO THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION AS A MEANS TO INVALIDATE THE LIQUOR
REGULATIONS
Maxwell’s Pic-Pac v. Dehner is the latest in a continuing trend of
federal court decisions that purportedly use rational basis review to
strike down state economic legislation. Much of this litigation is the
work of libertarian public policy organizations who argue that
“arbitrary” regulations on economic activity infringe on a right to work
inherent in the U.S. Constitution. This Part argues that the pattern of
lower federal courts holding economic legislation to heightened scrutiny
is not only in violation of controlling Supreme Court precedent but also
an unwarranted encroachment on federalism and the separation of
powers. It will also address Maxwell’s pending appeal to the Sixth
Circuit, and suggest that a more correct path to strike down the
Kentucky liquor control regime lies in the Kentucky Constitution.
A. Why the Trial Court’s Decision is an Application of Rational Basis
with Bite
When analyzed under the controlling Supreme Court precedents for
economic regulations, it is clear that the Maxwell’s court used a
heightened form of rational basis review. Traditional rational basis
review does not require a nexus between the actual, legitimate purpose
for a law and the classification it creates.123 All that is required is a
“reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis
for the classification,”124 which can be built on unsupported speculation,
and the burden is on the challenging party to negate every possible
justification for the law.125
But that is not what happened in Maxwell’s. First, by throwing out
the six proffered justifications for the statute one by one, and stopping
the inquiry there, the court effectively placed a burden of justification on
the government instead of a burden of negation on the challenging party.
Second, in stating that “courts must always ensure that some rational
link exists between a statute’s classification and objective,” it also
conflated the traditional rational basis test used for economic legislation
with the heightened test used mainly for politically unpopular groups.126
While it may be correct to say that classifications must have a rational
link to their objective, it is clear from precedent that “[i]t is enough
123.
124.
125.
126.

See supra Part II.B.
F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (emphasis added).
Id. at 315.
Maxwell’s, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 744.
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that . . . it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a
rational way to correct” a problem.127 As long as the legislature
reasonably believed a rational link existed, the court is not obligated to
establish the link through evidence.
For example, the Maxwell’s court said that the proposed link between
limiting access to alcoholic beverages and curbing alcohol abuse could
not be “rational” because there was no rational reason for treating
grocery stores and gas stations differently from other retailers.128 This,
however, ignores the precedent from Williamson that explicitly states
that “reform may take one step at a time.”129 The situation in Maxwell’s
is analogous to that in Williamson where sellers of ready-to-wear glasses
were allowed to fit lenses without prescriptions but opticians were not,
yet the law was allowed to stand for public health reasons.130 The
Maxwell’s court addressed Williamson by saying that, because the law
had been in place for seventy-four years, it did not believe the
legislature was addressing the problem one step at a time.131 However,
there is nothing in Williamson which requires that each “step” be taken
within a certain period of time, and it is simply enough that the
legislature could have reasonably believed the classification would have
the desired effect—the trial court even acknowledged as much.132 When
economic legislation is being challenged, the court’s belief in the
legislature’s wisdom is not traditionally what is at issue. When
reasonable people can disagree about the prudence of legislation, courts
should defer to the legislature, as Justice Holmes stated in his famous
Lochner dissent: “A reasonable man might think [a law to be] a proper
measure on the score of health[, while m]en whom I certainly could not
pronounce unreasonable would [uphold it]. Whether in the latter aspect
it would be open to the charge of inequality I think it unnecessary to
discuss.”133 Finally, the Equal Protection Clause has traditionally been
applied only to strike down invidious discrimination134—
“[d]iscrimination that is offensive or objectionable . . . because it

127. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (emphasis added).
128. Maxwell’s, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 749.
129. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 489.
130. See id.
131. Maxwell’s, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 751.
132. “Nevertheless, the State claims that withholding liquor licenses from grocery stores and gas
stations has some effect on each of the purposes it proffered. The truth of this assertion is not for the
Court to question, so long as it was conceivable that the Kentucky legislature could have believed it.”
Id. at 747 (emphasis added).
133. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
134. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 489 (1955) (“The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no
further than the invidious discrimination.”).
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involves prejudice or stereotyping”135—and that is clearly not what was
at issue in this case.
Because the application of heightened rational basis review to
economic legislation is against the weight of precedent, the question
becomes whether it is ever proper to apply this heightened standard to
economic legislation, and if so, when? Before that issue is addressed,
however, it is worth briefly discussing what it is about Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence that has created the problematic system of
distinctions between suspect classes and fundamental rights.
B. The Origin of the Textual Basis for Applying Heightened Scrutiny to
Economic Legislation
The argument for extending exacting standards of judicial review to
economic legislation has a basis in the text of the Constitution, but
perhaps only through an accident of history. Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment addresses two groups: “citizens” and “persons.”
Citizens are entitled to the privileges or immunities of United States
citizenship, while all persons, including noncitizens, are entitled to due
process of law and the equal protection of the laws.136 While the plain
language of the Amendment seems to indicate that the protection of
substantive rights would fall into the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
this is not how it has been interpreted. In the Slaughterhouse Cases,137
the Supreme Court effectively gutted this Clause by holding that it
“neither incorporated the Bill of Rights nor protected all rights of
individual citizens.”138 Instead, the Clause protects only rights of
federal citizenship, which include “the right to petition Congress, the
right to vote in federal elections, the right to interstate travel or
commerce, the right to enter federal lands, [and] the rights of a citizen
while in the custody of federal officers.”139 This decision is universally
acknowledged as an incorrect reading of the Clause, but since the Court
is always reluctant to overturn its own decisions, it subsequently has had
to look to other provisions of the Constitution to find protection for
substantive rights, namely the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses.140
135. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 535 (9th ed. 2009).
136. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
137. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
138. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 27, § 14.3(b).
139. Id.
140. See A. Christopher Bryant, What McDonald Means for Unenumerated Rights, 45 GA. L.
REV. 1073, 1077–80 (2011); Akhil Reed Amar, Substance and Method in the Year 2000, 28 PEPP. L.
REV. 601, 631 n.178 (2001) (“Virtually no serious modern scholar—left, right, and center—thinks that
this is a plausible reading of the Amendment.”).
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Though Lochner’s use of substantive due process in the economic
context was rejected, the Court revived the doctrine in the middle of the
twentieth century as a tool to protect certain “fundamental rights.”141
Many commentators and Justices have questioned the wisdom of
“read[ing] a clause evidently about procedures to be a font for
substantive rights,”142 since doing so strips such rights of an explicit
textual basis.143 It would certainly make more sense to derive such
rights from the Privileges or Immunities Clause, not only because of the
apparent plain meaning of the Clause, but also because fundamental
rights are more easily understood as rights reserved for individual
citizens. By deriving them instead from the Due Process Clause and
enforcing them through the Equal Protection Clause, the door is opened
for the following argument: “that the three-tiered approach [to judicial
review] is inherently unequal because differential treatment among
different groups should not translate into discriminatory treatment of
those groups by the Court.”144 In other words, how can protection be
equal if different classifications are held to different standards?145 This
distinction between persons and citizens becomes especially relevant to
the Maxwell’s case because the Supreme Court has held that
corporations are persons but not citizens.146 As a result, there is a strong
textual argument for extending exacting standards of judicial review to
all legislation, economic or otherwise.
C. The Argument in Favor of Applying Heightened Scrutiny to
Economic Legislation
It is the mission of organizations such as the Pacific Legal
Foundation147 and the Institute for Justice148 to achieve the above

141. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 27, § 15.7.
142. Bryant, supra note 140, at 1079.
143. Adam Lamparello, Taking the “Substance” Out of Substantive Due Process and Returning
Lawmaking Power to the Federal and State Legislatures, 63 S.C. L. REV. 285, 287–88 (2011).
144. Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
145. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 779 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The Equal
Protection Clause is itself a classic paradox, and makes sense only in the context of a recently fought
Civil War. It creates a requirement of equal treatment to be applied to the process of legislation whose
very purpose is to draw lines in such a way that different people are treated differently. The problem
presented is one of sorting the legislative distinctions which are acceptable from those which involve
invidiously unequal treatment.”).
146. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1869). Additionally, the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment itself precludes “citizenship” from corporations: “All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A
corporation cannot be “born” or “naturalized,” and therefore cannot be a citizen.
147. PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, http://www.pacificlegal.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2013).
148. THE INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, http://www.ij.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2013).
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described equality of judicial review as a bulwark against restrictions on
economic liberty. These organizations engage in litigation and policy
work with the intent of restoring economic liberty to its pre-New Deal
status149 and influencing judges to enforce “constitutional limits on
government power.”150 In practice, this would entail a return to the
Lochner era, where practically all legislation would be subject to some
form of heightened scrutiny. While an in-depth analysis of this
viewpoint is outside the scope of this Note, a few points merit attention.
The foundation of this viewpoint is that the right to work is a
“fundamental right” under the U.S. Constitution.151 And indeed, the
Court has acknowledged that, under the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of Article IV, § 2, this right may not be infringed by interstate
protectionist regulations.152 The argument is that the Court should
recognize these rights as a matter of substantive due process, or perhaps
preferably, through a revival of the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or
Immunities Clause.153 In either case, the end result would be the same:
judges properly engaged in determining the government’s actual ends
for all legislation and whether those ends are legitimate.154
Proponents of so-called “judicial engagement” argue that judges are
“abdicating” their proper role in evaluating the constitutionality of
legislation by hiding behind the rational basis test.155 They point out
that, in defending legislation under this test, “not only is the government
invited to dream up entirely post hoc rationalizations for challenged
legislation, it has no obligation to produce evidence in support of those
rationalizations either.”156 This could lead to absurd results:
[T]here are a small handful of states that prohibit self-service gas stations,
ostensibly for health and safety reasons. . . . [I]f lower courts actually
took the rational basis test at face value, it would matter not a whit if
every legislator who voted for the self-service gas station ban came into
court and swore on a stack of Bibles that he had only done so because he
was paid off by the service station lobby. In other words, as long as the
health and safety argument is “conceivable,” the fact that it is also

149. James W. Ely, Jr., Book Review, 15 THE INDEP. REV. 612 (2011).
150. Center for Judicial Engagement, THE INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, http://www.ij.org/cje (last
visited Aug. 27, 2013).
151. Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the Rational Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 898, 902–03 (2005) [hereinafter Neily, No Such Thing].
152. For example, a state may not bar nonresidents from becoming attorneys. See Supreme Court
of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
153. Clark Neily, Judicial Engagement Means No More Make-Believe Judging, 19 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 1053, 1062 (2012) [hereinafter Neily, Judicial Engagement].
154. Id. at 1056.
155. Neily, No Such Thing, supra note 151, at 903.
156. Id. at 900 (internal quotations omitted).
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perfectly fraudulent has no bearing on the outcome of a legal
challenge.157

In addition, the requirement that the challenging party negate every
conceivable justification for a law is “technically impossible to meet
because it is impossible to prove the non-existence of something as a
matter of formal logic.”158 Finally, they argue, the test is so flawed that
the Supreme Court must “misappl[y]” it “in order to achieve preferred
outcomes,” as was demonstrated in Cleburne and Romer.159
Certainly, these are strong arguments. It seems fairly obvious that
traditional rational basis review creates a situation where “the deck is
stacked so thoroughly against a litigant that the result of the case is
effectively preordained.”160 Frankly, this result was almost certainly the
Court’s intention in formulating the rational basis test as it has. The
Court likely wanted to remove itself from the business of reviewing
every piece of legislation that came its way and in response created a
test that was practically impossible for the government to fail. The
proponents of “judicial engagement” argue that it is time for judges to
cease the “abdication” of their proper role and demand legitimate
reasons for government regulation.161
It is this word “abdication” that is of interest for the purposes of this
Note. In his Maxwell’s opinion, Judge John G. Heyburn II twice states
that “deference” to the legislature does not equal “abdication.”162 His
use of the word “abdication” in this context is curious, considering that
Judge Heyburn, according to a Westlaw search, has never before used it
in a decision.163 One could draw the conclusion that Judge Heyburn is
familiar with the call for “judicial engagement” and its underlying
philosophy, and is choosing to “engage” by subjecting the Kentucky
legislation to heightened scrutiny. Perhaps it is just a coincidence, but
the use of such a loaded word in the context of rational basis review
certainly begs the question.
Regardless of the motivation behind the decision, Maxwell’s joins

157. Id. at 908–09.
158. Id. at 909.
159. Id. at 910.
160. Id.
161. Neily, Judicial Engagement, supra note 153, at 1070.
162. Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733, 744, 751 (W.D. Ky. 2012).
163. A WestlawNext search of Kentucky District Court opinions written by Judge John G.
Heyburn II produced 1,923 results (Heyburn has only judged in the Western District of Kentucky). A
search within those results for the string “abdicat!” produced two results. The result other than
Maxwell’s is from U.S. v. Ware, 154 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1025 (W.D. Ky. 2001). In that opinion, Heyburn
was quoting language from Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983). Heyburn, therefore, appears to
have only deliberately chosen to use a form of “abdicate” in the Maxwell’s opinion. A Lexis search
produced essentially the same results.
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several others in the category of federal litigation seeking to strike down
economic regulations under the rational basis test.164 If these cases have
anything in common, it is that they all seem to involve easy questions.
Surely, can’t reasonable people agree that Kentucky’s liquor controls
make no sense, or that African hair braiders should not be subject to
hundreds of hours of unnecessary cosmetology training, or that casket
retailers do not need training in mortuary science? Aren’t such laws
“uncommonly silly?”165
D. Why Deference to the Legislature on Economic Matters is Good
Jurisprudence for Federal Courts
The problem, of course, is that sometimes easy cases can also make
bad law.166 By continuing the misapplication of the rational basis test
begun in Cleburne, lower courts continue to muddle the standard and
call into question when and how it is to be used. These decisions are
motivated by laissez-faire principles, and are essentially about
substituting the wisdom of the courts for the wisdom of the
legislature.167 Perhaps this results in better policy, but “the postLochner line of cases clearly repudiate judicial efforts to enshrine
economic policies, even if ultimately wise, as constitutional rights.”168
Despite the textual flaws in its formulation, the post-Lochner
treatment of economic legislation is the correct policy. Equal protection
may not really be equal, but neither does the First Amendment’s “no
law” language really mean no law. Governments cannot operate in
absolutes, and placing the burden on state governments to justify every
regulation they enact under the police power would be a huge
encroachment on federalism. Since they are appointed to lifetime terms
and not elected, Article III judges are politically unaccountable, and
while this perhaps makes them ideal to combat invidious discrimination
and infringements on fundamental rights, giving them the ability to
substantively evaluate the legislature’s wisdom in every case is a bridge
too far. The counter is, of course, that the right to work, or practice a
lawful trade, is a fundamental right that courts have only recently
164. See supra Part II.B.
165. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
166. The original adage, “hard cases make bad law,” appears to derive from Baron Rolfe’s
opinion in Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 406, 10 M. & W. 109 (Ct. of Exchequer)
(Rolfe, B.) (“Hard cases, it has been frequently observed, are apt to introduce bad law.”). Rolfe was
referring to cases that “tempt a judge to stretch or even disregard a principle of law at issue.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 784 (9th ed. 2009). It goes without saying that the adage is applicable to Maxwell’s.
167. Gorod, supra note 15, at 543.
168. Id.
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decided to eschew. But the fact is that seventy-five years of Supreme
Court jurisprudence explicitly rejects the idea of any economic right
being fundamental, and the Court has given no indication that a return to
Lochner is warranted or desirable.
Consider the consequences of such a return. Imagine that a state
legislature, or perhaps even Congress, has chosen to institute a singlepayer healthcare system, thus largely eliminating the need for private
medical insurance. Could private insurers then challenge the law and
demand it be subject to heightened scrutiny on the grounds that it
infringes their “right to practice a lawful trade?” After all, these
companies are persons, and theoretically entitled to the equal protection
of the laws. One could counter that this hypothetical is in no way
comparable to the situation in Maxwell’s or its brethren—“those cases
are about silly laws that make no sense!” But this is the ultimate
problem with applying heightened scrutiny to economic legislation:
where do we draw the line, and who decides where it is drawn? Which
is preferable: letting unelected federal judges make policy decisions or
representative legislatures? There may be no clear philosophical
answer, but the Constitution comes down heavily on the side of
federalism and separation of powers, while it is silent on the matter of
economic rights. Alexander Hamilton certainly did not imagine the
judiciary to sit as a super-legislature when he wrote: “liberty . . . would
have every thing to fear from [the judiciary’s] union with either of the
other [branches of government]. . . . The complete independence of the
courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.”169
Lower courts should therefore follow precedent and stop subjecting
economic regulations to heightened judicial scrutiny: “Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate . . . [and] not prohibited . . . are constitutional.”170
However, the application of this proper deferential standard can still
be flawed. Courts are not necessarily obligated to assume, as the
Powers court did, that any proffered state objective, including economic
protectionism, is legitimate just so that an economic regulation can be
upheld. Certainly, as the concurring opinion in Powers noted, “[n]o
case holds that the bare preference of one economic actor while
furthering no greater public interest advances a ‘legitimate state
interest.’ . . . [T]he record . . . support[s] a conclusion that the
[regulation] here furthers, however imperfectly, an element of consumer
protection.”171 Because the scheme was conceivably related to a
legitimate interest, the Tenth Circuit should have stopped the inquiry
169. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
170. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819).
171. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1226 (10th Cir. 2004) (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
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there and ignored the question of economic protectionism entirely,
avoiding the circuit split simply by explaining that there was a
conceivable basis for the regulation. Likewise, the Western District of
Kentucky in Maxwell’s should have recognized that the classification
was flawed, but that the state’s proffered bases for the regulation were
within the bounds of reason, and ceased its Fourteenth Amendment
inquiry.172
E. What Will Happen on Appeal?
The question remains: what will become of the Maxwell’s decision at
the Sixth Circuit? As explained throughout this Note, a proper
application of rational basis review would certainly cause the decision to
be overturned. However, the Sixth Circuit showed in Craigmiles that it
was willing to apply heightened scrutiny to economic legislation, and
circuit courts are ostensibly obligated to follow their own precedents.
The question then is to what extent Craigmiles can be distinguished
from Maxwell’s and also to what extent the political leanings of the
individual circuit judges will impact their decisions. It seems fair to
assume that the latter question could be determinative, and therefore,
that the fate of Maxwell’s rests in large part on chance—in other words,
which judges will be assigned to the case.173 But these issues can be
rendered irrelevant if the statute is instead evaluated under the Kentucky
Constitution’s equal protection provisions.
F. Why the Kentucky Constitution May Allow the Classification to Be
Struck Down
The Kentucky Constitution allows for a higher standard of review
than traditional rational basis review to be applied to legislative
classifications.174 This standard is indeed very similar to the rational
basis with bite standard applied by the Supreme Court: there must be a
substantial and justifiable reason for a classification and the party
claiming validity must prove a valid nexus between classification and
purpose. In fact, the trial court in Maxwell’s applied such a standard:
since Kentucky could not prove that the classification/purpose nexus
existed, the statute was struck down.175 It is interesting, then, that the
trial court did not substantively address the question of the statute’s
172. “Where there are plausible reasons for Congress’ action, our inquiry is at an end.” F.C.C. v.
Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1993).
173. This information is not publicly released until two weeks prior to the hearing.
174. See supra Part II.C.
175. Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733, 752 (W.D. Ky. 2012).
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validity under the Kentucky Constitution, since it arguably had a greater
license to apply heightened scrutiny under Kentucky law than under
federal law.
A few questions remain, however. First, whether the classification at
issue is “special legislation.” It is arguable that this law is one that
“favors a special interest to the detriment of the rest of society.”176 The
intervening defendant acknowledged as much by stating that its
motivation for intervention was protecting its economic interest in the
continuance of the current liquor control scheme.177 Arguing that the
law is special legislation is problematic, however, since the original
purpose for the law is unknown. It also does not appear to be necessary
that the law qualify as special legislation for Kentucky’s heightened
standard of review to apply.178 Next, since the Kentucky Supreme
Court has limited the heightened standard of review to the facts of
particular cases, and has not delineated the controlling factors for its use,
it is unclear whether this statute would qualify as a circumstance for the
use of the standard. It does seem, however, that a sufficient amount of
Kentucky Supreme Court precedent calls for “a substantial and
justifiable reason apparent . . . from some . . . authoritative source” to
allow “discriminatory legislation” to be upheld.179 Finally, it must be
determined if the legislation fits into the public services exception found
in section three of the Kentucky Constitution (“no grant of exclusive,
separate public emoluments or privileges shall be made to any man or
set of men, except in consideration of public services”).180 In this
context, public services appears to refer to hospitals, the military, social
safety nets, etc., so this exception likely would not apply.181
In addition to requiring a “substantial and justifiable reason” for
discriminatory legislation,182 the Kentucky Supreme Court has stated
that if “it is clear [a] statute has no reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose and is arbitrary and discriminatory and without
substantial basis,” then it is proper to strike it down.183 The Maxwell’s
court found the law fit this profile, so the state constitution may
176. Yeoman v. Com., Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459, 468 (Ky. 1998).
177. Motion to Intervene at ¶¶13, 22, Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733
(W.D. Ky. 2012) (No. 3:11-CV-18-H).
178. See, e.g., Vision Mining, Inc. v. Gardner, 364 S.W.3d 455 (Ky. 2011) (applying the
“substantial and justifiable reason” standard without identifying the legislation at issue as “special
legislation”).
179. Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Ky. 1985).
180. KY. CONST., § 3.
181. See, e.g., Ky. Bldg. Comm’n v. Effron, 220 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1949); Bowman v. Frost, 158
S.W.2d 945 (Ky. 1942); Bosworth v. Harp, 157 S.W. 1084 (Ky. 1913).
182. Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Cheyenne Res., Inc., 163 S.W.3d 408, 418–19 (Ky. 2005).
183. Reeves v. Simons, 160 S.W.2d 149, 151–52 (Ky. 1942).
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therefore be a proper avenue to strike the statute down on appeal if the
Sixth Circuit were to determine that the U.S. Constitution did not
provide an avenue. The Maxwell’s court missed an opportunity by not
certifying the question of whether Kentucky state law bars this statute to
the Kentucky Supreme Court, as, based on an analysis of precedent,
there is a good chance that it would find the law unconstitutional. The
Sixth Circuit should not make the same mistake: in the interest of
federalism and the separation of powers, it should find the law
acceptable under the Federal Constitution, and look to the Kentucky
Supreme Court for guidance on the state constitutional issue.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Marshall’s Cleburne prophecy has proven true: lacking a
foundation and a clear direction from the Court regarding its use, lower
federal courts are applying heightened scrutiny to economic legislation
and taking steps toward a return to the Lochner era. In striking down as
unconstitutional the Kentucky liquor control regulation which explicitly
prohibits grocery stores and gas stations from selling wine and liquor,
the Western District of Kentucky joins these courts in incorrectly
applying a heightened standard of judicial review inappropriate for
economic legislation. And although the correct result on appeal is
dictated by Supreme Court precedent, the statute’s fate on appeal is
unclear. The Sixth Circuit has applied rational basis with bite to
economic legislation in the past and could potentially choose to do so
again. Doing so would exacerbate a circuit split and further muddle the
standards for when heightened scrutiny is appropriate. If the Sixth
Circuit believes the statute should be struck down, it should instead look
to the Kentucky Constitution, which gives greater leeway for the
application of heightened standards of review to economic legislation.
Ultimately, it is not for politically unaccountable Article III judges to
use the U.S. Constitution as a pretext to meddle in the affairs of
legislatures, except for the limited circumstances where invidious
discrimination or fundamental rights are involved. As Justice Thomas
explained:
[E]qual protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom,
fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of social and economic
policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines
nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against
equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of
184
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.

184. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (emphasis added).
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Lower federal courts need to get back to following this directive. It is
not an “abdication” to defer to the legislature in these matters, because
their proper role is deference. Legislatures may be imperfect, but at
least we can “throw the rascals [or bastards, bums, etc.] out” if we are
dissatisfied with their job.185 Those who complain that it is too difficult
to effect change via the legislature should perhaps concern themselves
with the underlying reasons for legislative failings instead of pushing a
Lochnerian agenda in federal court.
POST-SCRIPT

As this article was going to press in January 2014, the Sixth
Circuit overruled the district court’s decision in Maxwell’s Pic-Pac v.
Dehner and reinstated the Kentucky statute and regulations relating
to package liquor licenses. In its brief opinion, the court cited to
F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc. and found Kentucky’s liquor
laws were acceptable because “reasonably conceivable facts support
the contention that grocery stores and gas stations pose a greater risk
of exposing citizens to alcohol than do other retailers.”186 The court
noted that “Kentucky law occasionally subjects economic policies to
stricter standards,” but did not consider whether this standard should
be applied to the laws because “the [appellees] contend only that the
statute lacks a rational basis.”187
Though this author agrees with the Sixth Circuit’s decision, it is
disappointing that the question of the laws’ validity under the
Kentucky Constitution was neither considered by the court nor
argued by the parties. Full consideration of this question would have
provided more finality to this litigation; it remains to be seen whether
the Plaintiffs will now pursue their case in Kentucky state court.188
While this case came to the correct conclusion both for
jurisprudential and public policy reasons, it is important to note that
the other, similar cases discussed in this Note (e.g., Clayton v.
Steinagel, St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille) have not been similarly
overturned, and in fact, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in St.
Joseph Abbey v. Castille.189 For that reason, there is still the potential
185. “The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident
decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is
generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.” Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
186. Maxwell’s Pic-Pac v. Dehner, Nos. 12–6056, 12–6057, 12–6182, 2014 WL 128129 at *3, --F.3d ---- (6th Cir., Jan. 15, 2014).
187. Id.
188. Defeat would be all but certain for the Plaintiffs at the Supreme Court.
189. Castille v. St. Joseph Abbey, 134 S. Ct. 423 (2013).
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for lower courts to improperly extend higher scrutiny to economic
legislation, and this trend should be carefully monitored.
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